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International economic integration has increased since the 
1970s. Those familiar  
with the work of Karl Polanyi have not been surprised that 
integration has brought forth protest and critique. The movement of 
the market into new areas and aspects of social life stimulates 
society to protect itself against the market's destabilizing effects 
(Polanyi, 1944). The decline of the labor movement in the US and 
some European countries has been accompanied by new organized 
labor movements in industrializing countries such as Poland, South 
Africa, Brazil and South Korea (Silver, 1994). 
Integration has occurred not only amongst similar societies, 
as in Europe, but among societies whose living standards, social 
norms, and standard economic practices differ wildly. This has 
raised a number of problems, most especially concerning the rights 
of labor. 
Critics of "globalization" have argued that "core" labor rights 
should be written into regional and multilateral trade agreements. 
"Free traders" argue that setting such standards prohibits the very 
differences that are the basis of trade. Universal labor standards 
treat the “cheap labor” that is the comparative advantage of the 
poor countries as something to be outlawed. If labor rights are an 
issue at all they should be dealt with by the International Labor 
Organization, not in trade agreements. The critics find this less 
than satisfactory, as the ILO has no enforcement capability.  
We argue that the ILO may in fact be an appropriate body for 
dealing with labor rights, though not for the reasons that the "free 
traders" stand on. Rather, the ILO, as an explicitly tripartite 
organization, embodies the problem solving principles of John R. 
Commons. Commons argued that labor (and other) disputes could 
not be resolved by reference to general principles, such as cost-
benefit analysis. Resolution required that all interested parties have 
a seat at the bargaining table, where they could establish 
“reasonable value.”  
There are problems in applying this approach internationally. 
Neither the principles of tripartism nor the presumption of "core" 
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labor rights is well established in all member countries. The ILO 
lacks the economic sanctions and the ability to threaten violence that 
establishment of truly international labor norms would require. But 
it is possible that incorporating ILO findings in national decision 
making may promote the ILO as an authoritative figure. In any case, 
in its core values, organizational structure, and understanding of 
economic processes, the ILO is consistent with Commons’ theoretical 
standpoint, his theory of value, and his analysis of labor markets.  
We begin with a brief discussion of existing perspectives on 
international labor rights. We then develop the Commons approach. 
In the last section we examine the evolution of the ILO and its 
relationship to Commons’ standpoint, theory of reasonable value, 
and analysis of labor markets. We consider some of the difficulties in 
creating reasonable value and authoritative institutions 
internationally. 
 
2. Economics of International Labor Rights 
 
The world economy is not nearly as integrated as some of the 
more celebratory proponents of globalization imply: national borders 
still inhibit the movement of money, capital and especially people. 
While formal barriers to trade have declined substantially, 
international price arbitrage happens slowly, investment portfolios 
still exhibit substantial home country bias, and severe barriers to the 
movement of labor are the exception rather than the rule (Rodrik, 
2000). Still, as measured by the ratio of exports to gross domestic 
product, national economies are substantially more integrated today 
than they were in the post World War II period. 
Such integration has had a significant effect on labor market 
outcomes in the United States. One econometric estimate indicates 
that increased trade and immigration are responsible for roughly 
forty percent of the growing wage gap between more and less 
educated workers (Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997). If increased 
trade competition forces labor saving technological change and 
makes it easier for management to discipline labor, then the figure is 
probably much higher (Wood, 1995). International capital mobility 
reduces workers' bargaining power, subjects them to greater 
instability of employment and incomes, and forces workers to bear a 
greater proportion of the non-wage costs of work, such as safe 
working conditions and health costs (Bronfenbrenner, 2001, Rodrik, 
1997). At a broader level, Freeman (1996) estimates that the majority 
of the increase in income inequality in the United States is due to the 
"de-institutionalization of wage norms" through increased trade, 
capital mobility, immigration, declining unionization, and the long 
term decline in the minimum wage.  
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Because social change is a holistic process we would prefer 
not to get caught up in the debate over which supposedly 
independent factor is the “most” important in causing increased 
inequality. In our view there is no statistical test by which we could 
“prove” that increased international economic integration is the most 
important. But the more popular view amongst policymakers - 
technological change is the culprit - has surprisingly little supporting 
evidence, and seems to be more wishful thinking than careful 
analysis (Rodrik, 1997, p.16).1 
Even if we can establish that international integration has 
negative effects on labor market outcomes, this does not demonstrate 
that labor rights have been affected, as rights deal with process not 
outcome. "Core" labor rights as defined by the International Labor 
Organization include freedom of association, right to organize and 
bargain collectively, right to refuse forced labor, right to freedom from 
child labor, and right to work free from discrimination.2 In the US at 
least, there is some evidence that capital mobility compromises the 
right to organize and bargain collectively. Kate Bronfenbrenner has 
found that "the recent acceleration in capital mobility has had a 
devastating impact on the extent and nature of union organizing 
campaigns" (Bronfenbrenner, 2000, p.iv). Her examination of NLRB 
data indicates that plant-closing threats are increasingly likely to 
deter successful organizing and that such threats are not tied to the 
financial conditions of the companies involved. 
Of course it is difficult to assess how much economic 
integration has strengthened employers’ hands and how much of this 
is simply due to the general deterioration of labor rights in the US 
(Compa, 2000). Bronfenbrenner found that unions are increasingly 
unlikely to file unfair labor practice complaints in response to plant 
closing threats during organizing campaigns because they are so 
difficult to prove and relief is so limited under existing law. She 
concludes that "plant closing threats are just another tactic in their 
(ownership/management) anti-union campaigns, one that very 
effectively plays on the real fears of workers living and working in an 
increasingly mobile economy" (Bronfenbrenner, 2000, p.vi). 
Even if increased economic integration erodes labor rights, 
trade policy may not be the appropriate redress. Many orthodox 
(neoclassical) economists and poor country elites argue that concern 
with labor rights in the US is just disguised "protectionism." Gary 
Fields argues that the list of process rights that are acceptable cross-
 
1 Institutional economics as we understand it relies on the method of holistic “pattern 
modeling” in empirical research. This involves iterative case studies that seek to 
identify patterns of causation. See Wilber and Harrison, 1978. 
2 Why these should be in the “core” and not other “rights” such as health and safety or 
a living wage is beyond our scope here. See McIntyre (2003a) for a discussion of class 
interests and moral convention as discursive determinants of labor rights. 
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culturally is actually quite short - prohibition of slavery and child 
labor, freedom of association, and reasonably safe working 
conditions. Beyond these, economies should be judged based on 
“outcomes oriented labor standards - employment and wage growth - 
and these are most likely to occur with market wage determination 
and minimal regulation of the employment relationship” (Fields, 
1990).3  
Jagdish Bhagwati claims that environmental and labor 
standards are a purely domestic matter and should not be subjects 
for trade negotiations. But he acknowledges that labor standards, 
“unlike most environmental standards, are seen in moral terms.” “In 
particular, it is argued that if labour standards elsewhere are 
different and unacceptable morally, then the resulting competition is 
morally illegitimate and `unfair’” (Bhagwati, 1998, p.258). 
Bhagwati argues that in the case of slavery there will be 
nearly universal agreement on this proposition. “…if slavery 
produces competitive advantage, that advantage is illegitimate and 
ought to be rejected” (ibid). In this case Bhagwati would support the 
inclusion of a “social clause” concerning labor standards in trade 
agreements. But, he insists, the list of “universally condemned 
practices such as slavery” is quite short. It is worth quoting Bhagwati 
at some length here.  
“True, the ILO has many conventions that many nations have 
signed. But many have been signed simply because in effect 
they are not binding. Equally, the United States itself has 
signed no more than a tiny fraction of these conventions in 
any case. The question whether a substantive consensus on 
anything except well-meaning and broad principles without 
consequences for trade access in case of noncompliance can 
be obtained is therefore highly dubious. 
 Indeed, the reality is that diversity of labour practice and 
standards is widespread in practice and reflects, not 
necessarily venality and wickedness, but rather diversity of 
cultural values, economic conditions, and analytical beliefs 
and theories concerning the economic (and therefore moral) 
consequences of specific labor standards. The notion that 
labour standards can be universalised, like human rights 
such as liberty and habeas corpus, simply by calling them 
 
3 Even orthodox economists sympathetic to organized labor are skeptical about 
including labor rights clauses in trade agreements. For instance, Richard Freeman 
argues that improvements in labor rights can be "paid for" through currency 
devaluation, or tax increases (Freeman, 1994). To the extent that international 
solutions are necessary he favors product labeling which allows consumers to express 
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"labour rights" ignores the fact that this easy equation 
between culture-specific labour standards and universal 
human rights will have a difficult time surviving deeper 
scrutiny (ibid, pp.260-61) 
That the US could see its trading rights suspended because of 
violations of core labor rights is clearly correct.4 It is also true that in 
practice core and other important “rights” are not treated as rights. 
As Bhagwati notes, the right to organize, protection for migrant 
workers, and guarantees against sweatshop conditions are weak or 
non-existent in the US today. As the US (with France) tends to be the 
chief exponent of a social clause, there is no small amount of 
hypocrisy here. 
Bhagwati argues that positive rights, such as the right to 
organize and bargain collectively, can have perverse effects in a 
developing country context. Unionization could primarily benefit 
insiders who already have jobs at the expense of unemployed 
outsiders, and would primarily help the urban working class, which 
tends to be better off already than the landless poor. The latter group 
would be best aided through rapid growth, which, according to 
Bhagwati, might be hindered by urban unionization. For Bhagwati, it 
is growth alone that can pull the majority of workers out of absolute 
poverty. 
“If so, the imposition of the culture-specific developed-country-
union views on poor countries about the rights of unions to push for 
higher wages will resolve current equity and intergenerational equity 
problems in ways that are normally unacceptable to these countries, 
and correctly so” (ibid, p.263). 
In this view the alleged universality of core labor standards is 
incorrect, except for a few special cases (i.e., slavery) and the idea of 
including a social clause in trade agreements is faulty as it rejects 
the culturally based diversity of actually existed labor practices. The 
belief that the social clause is simply disguised protectionism is 
shared by many on the political left in developing countries. (See 
Kohr, 1997)5 
Bhagwati suggests that the more appropriate avenue for 
ratcheting up labor standards is the work of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and the International Labor Organization. For 
Bhagwati, the educational activities of these organizations, to the 
extent they have good ideas, should be sufficient.  
 
4 See McIntyre and Bodah (2002) for a detailed discussion of the US and ILO 
conventions. 
5 The popular opposition to the World Trade Organization and other multilateral 
institutions in the developed countries contains groups who are more united by what 
they oppose than any particular argument in favor of international labor rights. At this 
time the "Seattle coalition" is more interested in organizing against the institutions of 
globalization than in solving concrete labor problems (Panitch, 2001).  
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“In fact, if your ideas are good, they should spread without 
coercion. The Spanish Inquisition should not be necessary to spread 
Christianity; indeed, the pope has no troops. Mahatma Gandhi's 
splendid idea of non-violent agitation spread was picked up by 
Martin Luther King, not because he worked on the Indian 
government to threaten retribution against others otherwise; it 
happened to be just morally compelling” (ibid, p.264). 
Private boycotts could also be used to create a multinational 
consensus in favor of labor standards. Such standards, he argues,  
“should be carefully defined and formally agreed to at the ILO 
today in light of modern thinking in economics and of the 
accumulated experience of developmental and labour issues 
date, and with the clear understanding that we are not just 
passing resolutions but that serious consequences may follow 
for follow-through by the signatory nations. The ILO is clearly 
the institution that is best equipped to create such a 
consensus, not the GATT/WTO, just as multilateral trade 
negotiations are conducted at the GATT, not at the ILO” (ibid). 
His argument betrays a convenient naivete about the social 
creation of knowledge and we presume that by “modern thinking in 
economics” Bhagwati means his own preferred brand, neoclassical 
theory. But he does point out an important issue: rights are created 
not discovered. Rights exist only when they are embodied in laws 
that can be enforced by courts.  
There are neoclassical economists who argue for labor 
standards. According to Dani Rodrik, there is "genuine 
discomfort...with the moral and social implications of trade." As 
evidence he points to the fact that members of Congress who co-
sponsored the Child Labor Deterrence Act were predominantly from 
districts with low numbers of high school dropouts. In other words, 
their interest in the bill stemmed primarily from the moral not the 
economic interests of their constituents. Rodrik believes that this 
demonstrates a prevailing norm under which it is "not acceptable to 
reduce the living standards of American workers by taking advantage 
of labor practices that are vastly below those enshrined in US 
standards" (Rodrik, 1997, p34). 
The governing concept here is “blocked exchange”. The Fair 
Labor Standards Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act are 
both justified by the doctrine of blocked or "desperate" exchange, 
under which a market transaction will be prohibited even if the two 
parties agree to it, when bargaining power is wildly unequal. If 
someone puts a gun to my head and asks for money I may give him 
my wallet. A starving person may agree to sell herself into slavery. In 
each case, both parties have an interest in completing the 
transaction, but this hardly legitimates it. The Supreme Court, in the 
1937 West Coast Hotel vs Parrish case, recognized that this concept 
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is particularly applicable to labor markets. According to Rodrik 
again, "US laws since the 1930s have recognized that restrictions on 
'free' contracts are legitimate in the case of unequal bargaining 
power.by generating an inequality in bargaining power globalization 
helps undermine 60 years of labor legislation and thus the social 
understanding those laws represent" (Rodrik, 1997, p.36).  
These legal and normative concepts stand uneasily in the 
broad corpus of contemporary mainstream academic economics in 
the United States.6 But they are consistent with the institutional 
labor economics of John R. Commons, and with the approach to 
labor problems taken historically by the International Labor 
Organization. . Before considering the contemporary international 
organization of labor rights in more detail we turn to a brief 
summary of Commons work and its applicability to international 
labor problems.  
 
3.1 Overview of Common’s Standpoint 
 
There is no way to convey the entirety or the subtlety of 
Commons’s theoretical conception of the market system within the 
space constraints operative here. What must suffice, and hence what 
follows, is a highly abridged statement of Commons’s relevant ideas.7 
Commons saw economic activity as inherently a group 
phenomenon. He used the term going concern in reference to the 
groups within which individuals engage in ongoing coordinated 
activity directed to ends foreseen in the future, whether such activity 
involves production or the use of its fruits (consumption). An elastic 
concept, going concerns includes entities such as families, 
corporations, unions and nations among countless more. According 
to Commons, the transaction-“a unit of transfer of legal control”-is 
the basic unit of activity within the concern, one that foreshadows an 
agent’s subsequent performance. Transactions emanate from a 
contest of individual wills - Commons’s term for the self-directing 
capacities of individuals - in the context of conflicts of interest 
arising from self-interested individuals’ desire to capture for 
themselves a greater share of the benefits generated by the concern’s 
collective undertaking and to reduce the share of the collective 
burden they individually bear. Departing from the comforting 
presumption of “natural harmony,” Commons embraced the 
Hobbesian position that disorder and disharmony are the natural 
 
6 Orthodox trade theory has become more open in recent years, with the development 
of imperfect competition and “eclectic” models of trade (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2001). 
It seems to us that acceptance of the neoclassical standpoint necessitates a doctrinal 
commitment to free trade as the default position however. A full consideration of this 
point is beyond our scope in this paper.    
7 For a more satisfactory overview, see Ramstad (1990). 
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results of “free” behavior. Orderly conduct, he argued, occurs only 
because every concern has in place working rules-rules (including 
custom) establishing what individuals can, must, or may do, or not 
do, in their transactions with one another within the concern-
enforced by moral, economic, or physical sanctions. Significantly, in 
the absence of force, working rules will tend to be ignored by agents 
so long as the economic and social consequences of doing so are 
deemed acceptable.  
Working rules objectify themselves in the actual transactions 
and consequent activities of a going concern’s “citizens.” From a legal 
perspective, Commons divided working rules into two types creating 
fundamentally different types of practices within the concern: those 
establishing specific rights for one class of citizens and correlative 
duties for another class, thereby creating authoritative practices; and 
those establishing zones of exposure (no rights) for one class to the 
liberties (no duties) carved out for another, thereby creating 
authorized practices.  
To ensure individual compliance with the governing rules in 
the event it is not forthcoming willingly, every concern must have an 
authoritative figure, someone who is empowered to make final 
decisions within the concern and who has sufficient control over 
sanctions to obtain individual obedience to those decisions. This 
being the case, Commons submitted, coercion is the dominant 
principle underlying activity within going concerns, and organized 
compulsion is the true source of order within its ambit.  
Yet, despite the underlying coercive structure, “required” behavior is 
generally experienced as forthcoming voluntarily. In the pragmatist 
tradition, Commons considered individuals to be institutionalized 
minds whose mental habits derive from the routines and practices 
(working rules) structuring their activities within going concerns. In 
his understanding, individual wills quickly or slowly adjust to the 
patterns implicit in working rules. That is, what working rules in fact 
require us to do comes to be seen as “right” or “natural” and is 
typically experienced as voluntary activity. Thus institutions-defined 
by Commons as “collective action in control, liberation, and 
expansion of individual action”-are the submerged dominant factor 
“explaining” the content of individual activity. 
Despite the existence of governing working rules, conflicts of 
interest are not always satisfactorily contained. For example, 
technological evolution tends to generate new patterns of activity 
imperfectly governed by the existing rules. This, in turn, precipitates 
overt conflicts about the sharing of the burdens and benefits 
occasioned by the new pattern of activity that threaten to undermine 
order within the concern. Such conflicts are hence brought to the 
concern’s authoritative figure for adjudication and determination of 
what the controlling rules are in fact to be. Thus Commons 
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understood volitional institutional adjustment by authoritative 
figures, not the so-called price mechanism, to be the concern’s true 
means of correlating the activities of economic agents. Significantly, 
the adjustment of working rules is always forward-looking and hence 
guided by purpose. In other words, in selecting a particular rule the 
authoritative figure necessarily endorses one set of envisioned future 
consequences as superior to another. This means that human values 
as to what should count most-that is, ethics-are necessarily woven 
into the very fabric of a concern’s working rules.  
As previously suggested, working rules will generally be 
adhered to only if there are sanctions applied to violators. Of the 
three principal sanctions, social disapproval, economic privation, and 
physical force, the latter provides the most powerful inducement. 
Accordingly, the party able to command superior force-in the present 
setting, the sovereign figure of the going concern we call the nation-
has the power, outside of warfare between nations, to determine the 
working rules that must be adhered to under its dominion, and 
hence the purposes embraced by the sovereign are controlling in 
guiding the evolution of working rules. Believing there is no such 
thing as the public interest but only private interests, Common used 
the term public purpose in regard to a private purpose, arising out of 
private interests, approved of by the sovereign.  
It is evident that Commons’s framework has implications for 
some basic economic abstractions. First, the concept of an economy 
is simply the concept “going concern” enlarged to encompass the 
coordinated “economic” activity of a region, a nation, or the world 
when viewed as a whole. Second, the "price mechanism" is seen not 
as a natural process inherent in the nature of things but as an 
instituted pattern of interaction-an integrated network of 
authoritative and authorized practices-volitionally "constructed" 
gradually over many centuries to effectuate human purposes; 
accordingly, Commons appropriated as a metaphor Darwin's term 
"artificial selection" to indicate that human volition rather than a 
brute process governs the price mechanism's evolution. Third, being 
nothing more than the pecuniary consequences of adhering to the 
specific practices mandated or authorized by the controlling working 
rules, prices are similarly conceived as instituted phenomena. 
Fourth, since working rules provide a general blueprint for allocating 
the burdens and benefits of the concern’s collective undertaken 
among various classes of its citizens and thereby prefigure the 
pecuniary consequences of adhering to those working rules, that is, 
market values, Commons maintained that economic values have at 
their root purpose-driven human volition and do not emanate from 
the “mechanical” operating of the price mechanism. Fifth, 
“competition” is understood as a zone of liberty (authorized practices) 
created and enforced through collective action, and as such does not 
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possess a natural logic (as suggested by the institution-free model of 
“perfect competition”) and does not “naturally” effectuate any end 
(such as “efficiency”). And, sixth, since there is no inherently best or 
natural set of working rules determining competition’s concrete 
character, the significant question is not whether its actual form 
approximates an ideal conception (perfect competition) but whether it 
is efficacious for realizing the public purposes the working rules 
constituting its character were instituted to effectuate and, more 
importantly, whether it is efficacious for realizing the public purposes 
currently embraced by the sovereign. 
 
3.2 Commons’s Theory of Reasonable Value 
 
Because of the central role he accorded human volition in 
creating the system of working rules, and because he understood 
those rules therefore to be a root cause of price and distributional 
outcomes, Commons submitted that he had worked out a volitional 
theory of value in contrast to the static mechanism theory utilized by 
neoclassical economists and the natural selection theory informing 
various evolutionary conceptions of the market system. In principle, 
of course, individual market systems (national going concerns) can 
consist of different working rules selected to realize different 
purposes. Commons coined the term “theory of reasonable value” in 
reference to the specific volitional underpinnings of the American 
market system (going concern).  
Commons settled on this term because he discovered that 
“reasonableness” had been the dominant purpose guiding the 
process of authoritative dispute resolution through which English 
common law judges, and later the U.S. Supreme Court justices, has 
crafted out the system of working rules-or property rights-
structuring the price bargain, the wage bargain, and the rent bargain 
in the American economy of his day. By focusing on reasonableness, 
Commons inferred that the courts had indicated a preoccupation, 
first, with maintaining order and, second, with ensuring that in light 
of all known facts the adopted rules were as “fair to all parties 
concerned” as possible. In other words, Commons discovered that 
“fairness” was a primary purpose toward whose realization the 
American market system had been volitionally instituted. 
Accordingly, by deciding that a particular working rule was 
reasonable and hence should be adopted, common law judges and 
courts had consecutively indicated a belief that market prices 
resulting from adherence to it would consequently be “fair” or “just” 
ones. As a result, Commons inferred that fairness was intended to 
characterize the transactional outcomes known as price, wage, and 
rent bargains. Hence he used the term “reasonable value” as a 
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descriptive term in reference to market outcomes in the American 
economy. 
The issue of what “fairness” entails is a deep one. Commons 
discerned that in the minds of justices deciding disputes over the 
many centuries during which the market system was gradually 
instituted, “fair” generally meant little more than “customary.” Of 
course, disputes invariably require judges to assess tradeoffs 
between various established practices and the various “good” 
consequences they facilitate. In assessing such tradeoffs, Commons 
insisted, the class bias of judges, who have overwhelmingly come out 
of the propertied classes, has inevitably colored their judgment. 
Deeply committed to the idea that all humans have the “citizenship” 
potential to participate as equals in their own governance, that is, in 
the process of institutional adjustment, Commons equated social 
progress with the synthesis of an ever-broadening set of private 
interests into the public purposes guiding the ongoing process of 
institutional adjustment (as putatively occurs with representative 
democracy). Accordingly, Commons envisioned a future in which 
working rule adjustments affecting price, wage, and rent bargains 
would emanate from a collective will that equally accommodates or 
synthesizes the conflicting private interests typical of all classes of 
“citizens” within the concern. In other words, for Commons the 
operative meaning of “fair” should be “agreed to without coercion by 
all affected parties.”  
Thus a regime of truly Reasonable market values presumes 
working rules that are “fair” in the sense that they have been agreed 
to without coercion by the most directly affected parties. This, of 
course, is precisely what is approximated by collective bargaining 
between a corporation and a union representing its workers. 
However, Commons gradually lost faith that unions could 
successfully organize a majority of the work force and helped in 
Wisconsin to institute a quasi-corporatist “statist” solution to the 
problem. That solution was the Wisconsin Industrial Commission, 
established in 1911 to oversee the evolution of working rules 
affecting the real wage (this includes working conditions) obtained by 
industrial workers in Wisconsin. Viewing the Wisconsin experiment 
as successful, Commons proposed that the “fourth branch of 
government,” the regulatory commission, could be similarly utilized 
to oversee the evolution of labor market working rules at the national 
level as well. 
According to Commons, a regulatory commission will be able 
to work out truly Reasonable compromises to the disputes brought 
before it, and thereby contribute to the production of truly 
Reasonable market values, only if it consists of an equal number of 
self-selected members from the two principal opposing interests, 
ones who actually understand the tradeoffs involved from inside the 
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class mentality, who in turn would be required to agree on one or 
more additional members who would serve as tie-breakers. To put 
the issue the other way, no members should be appointed to 
represent the strictly hypothetical “public interest.” Needless to say, 
this makes Commons’s proposal significantly different from the 
course actually chosen in the United States. Commons further 
proposed that regulatory commissions be given only a broad 
mandate by legislative bodies-for example, a mandate to establish 
and maintain “reasonable working standards,” and that they be left 
free to work out for themselves the practices that correspond to this 
standard. In addition, Commons urged that when searching for a 
model of “the possible” the commissions should limit themselves to 
practices already shown to be practical by evidence of their adoption 
by economically viable concerns and avoid the ideal, economically 
untested prescriptions of “experts.” Those practices would then be 
made mandatory for all. 
Before proceeding further with the discussion of the 
regulatory commission’s role in effecting economic progress, it may 
be best first to review Commons’s conception of labor markets. 
 
3.3 Commons’s Analysis of the Labor Market 
 
Like many in his generation, Commons embraced Henry 
Carter Adams’s contention that competitive labor markets were 
plagued by “destructive competition.” In this view, when there is 
some degree of redundancy in labor supply competition among 
workers drives all toward the lowest common denominator-or in 
Commons’s terminology, toward the standards of the “least 
conscientious” employers. Where international trade is concerned, 
Commons argued, labor supply premised on “offer prices” tied to 
vastly different prevailing standards of living reinforce this downward 
tendency. 
Commons revealed greater insight into the logic of 
“destructive competition” in his famous article showing how 
“extension of the market,” which Adam Smith had glorified as the 
generator of productivity increases, changed the nature of the “labor 
market” faced by American shoemakers and, in consequence, the 
protective devices they pursued to shelter themselves from the 
unwanted “competitive menace” (see Commons 1909). As the product 
market served by shoe makers moved from (1) the custom order 
stage (a personal market in which the consumer purchased directly 
from itinerant shoemakers) to (2) the retail shop stage (a local market 
in which consumers could purchase either directly from itinerant 
shoemakers or from a local retain establishment supplied by the 
same shoemakers) to (3) the wholesale order stage (a regional market 
supplied by full time shop workers who never dealt directly with 
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consumers, but one in which production was always preceded by an 
order from a specific retailer) and finally to (4) the wholesale 
speculative state (a regional, national, or even world market in which 
production precedes the decision of a retailer to place an order). 
These stages are recapitulated in Figure 1, shown on the next page. 
In the initial stage of this evolutionary process, the actual 
producer (shoemaker) dealt directly with the eventual user of the 
product (consumer) and simultaneously negotiated a satisfactory 
price and an implicit wage. The fundamental conflict of interest 
involves the interest of the consumer in a lower price and the interest 
of the worker in a higher wage and better conditions of work. When 
consumer and producer were bargaining equals, neither was able to 
exercise control over the price bargain (which included agreement 
about the quality of the shoe to be produced) and thereby implicitly 
the wage bargain. When the retail shop stage appeared, the worker 
began to lose control over both the price bargain and the quality of 
the shoe, which were now decided through negotiations between the 
consumer and the retailer. Thus the producer’s role became limited 
to negotiating a supply price with the producer for footwear of the 
type and quality the customer desired. Objectively, the retailer now 
became an employer and the producer a wage worker. Still, as the 
actual work was not performed until the consumer negotiated a 
specific order from the retailer, the producer maintained some 
negotiating power regarding the wage bargain since the retailer 
continued to possess limited power to pass a higher wage on to the 
consumer through a higher price or lowered quality.  
When the wholesale order stage emerged, the producer was placed in 
an even weaker position in regard to his ability to maintain 
satisfactory wages. Now there were two price bargains in which the 
producer did not participate, the first between the customer and the 
retail merchant followed by another between the retail merchant and 
the wholesale merchant. The wage bargain, in turn, was now 
negotiated between the wholesaler and the producer. With this stage 
the producer lost any control over the quality of the product and 
became a piece worker. Still, because work was initiated only after 
both price bargains had been negotiated, the worker continued to 
possess some degree of power over the wage negotiation, since a 
higher price could potentially be passed forward to the customer via 
the price bargain. However, if workers, now preoccupied with the 
wage bargain, demanded a wage increase after an order was taken, 
that is, after the price bargain between the wholesaler and the 
retailer had been negotiated, a direct conflict of interest resulted 
between the wholesale merchant and the producer, wherein the 
wholesale merchant’s own interest necessitated that he oppose the 
workers’ demand. It is at this stage, in other words, that the 
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employer function comes to the forefront and where, Commons 





Evolution of the Wage Bargain 
(Shoemakers Article) 
 
Two bargains: P - Price Bargain (Exchange of ownership of a 
produced good) W - Wage Bargain (Exchange of ownership of labor 
power) 
 
Ultimately, the central conflict is between the interest of the 
consumer in a lower price and the interest of the worker in a 
higher wage and better conditions of work. The issue is: who 
has the advantage? 
 
Stage     Bargains 
 
       P 
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 Mkt) 
 
At all stages, workers seek “protective device” from 
“competitive menace” 
 (1) protective organization (e.g., unions) 
(2) protective legislation (e.g., labor “standards”)  
 
With the advent of the wholesale speculative stage, the 
producer becomes completely subordinated to the consumer and the 
phenomenon of destructive competition is born. Now there are three 
price bargains: first, between the customer and the retail merchant; 
second, between the retailer and the capitalist merchant organizing 
the distribution of a specific shoe; and third, between the capitalists 
manufacturing firms who can only obtain a profit margin by means 
of “sweating” the worker or cheapening work. With this stage, the 
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capitalist merchant takes on the role of the wholesale merchant but 
adds the function of maintaining stock in anticipation of orders from 
retailers. To acquire and maintain that stock, the capitalist merchant 
negotiates the first price in the chain, a supply price from the 
manufacturer who, being compelled to compete vigorously with other 
manufacturers, can raise its profit level only by finding ways to 
reduce the costs of producing the agreed upon output, primarily by 
specializing in reducing the cost of its labor “input” per unit of 
output. Subsequently, the capitalist merchant negotiates a price 
bargain with a retail merchant but must bear the risk of being stuck 
with stock that cannot be sold at a price allowing for recovery of the 
previously negotiated price with the manufacturer and also the other 
necessary costs of doing business. The retail merchant, of course, is 
limited in his bargaining with the wholesaler by the knowledge that 
the consumer is ultimately the controlling party in the price bargain 
between the consumer and the retailer.  
What is significant here is that with this fourth stage of the 
shoemakers labor market, complete separation between consumer 
and producer has occurred, with the former possessing complete 
control, ultimately, over the wage bargain’s upper limit. The 
manufacturer profits by driving the wage bargain below that limit. 
That is, the manufacturer profits by advancing the process earlier 
referred to as destructive competition. Competition between 
producers requires that all adopt the same methods or be driven out 
of business. 
 
3.4 The Theory of Reasonable Value (continued) 
 
If labor is allowed to compete “freely,” that is, without 
restrictions, destructive competition-the gradual spread throughout 
the labor market of the least costly practices-is the inherent 
tendency if there is redundant labor. It is the role of labor standards 
to prevent that downward spiral and thereby to preserve socially 
acceptable labor market outcomes. Equally important, at the bottom 
of the labor market-and, to a lesser extent at higher levels, especially 
in regard to working conditions-improvement of the worker’s 
situation occurs through a raising of those standards, or as 
Commons put it, by “raising the plane of competition.” The 
regulatory commission, as conceived by Commons, provides a 
governance structure through which destructive competition can be 
avoided and the plane of competition-and thereby attainments-in the 
labor market can be raised. Equally important, its composition 
allows workers, understood as “citizens” of their concerns with equal 
rights of self-determination rather than as “owners” offering a 
commodity (themselves) for sale, to participate as equals in the 
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process of determining which working rules, that is, which labor 
standards, are at any given time considering the tradeoffs involved 
the “best” ones attainable. Therein, a just compromise between the 
divergent interests of the employer for higher profits and the worker 
for higher wages and better working conditions can be worked out 
and objectified in the adopted working rules. And the market values 
resulting from adherence to those rules will truly be Reasonable 
ones-as good as practicable for now.  
 
4. International Organization of Labor Rights 
  
In terms of figure 1, the increased international integration of 
the last several decades has lengthened the bargaining chain 
between producers and consumers. Moreover, it has weakened the 
effectiveness of national systems of labor regulation. In this section 
we examine the extent to which the International Labour 
Organization might act as an authoritative institution for global 
bargaining chains. 
Our point is not to show that, in each and every instance, the 
ILO fits (or does not fit) the Commons framework. Such an exercise 
would be both endless and pointless. Rather, we will show that in its 
chief purposes and overall organization, the ILO is consistent with 
Commons standpoint, his theory of reasonable value, and his 
analysis of labor markets. In the closing section we examine some of 
the implications of this consistency. 
The initial impetus for international labor legislation and an 
international labor organization came as a response to the human 
costs of the industrial revolution. Its prime movers were intellectual 
elements of the 19th century middle class: industrial managers, 
politicians, public health physicians, utopian socialists and reform 
economists. Three goals drove these groups: humanitarian concerns, 
desire for social peace, and the desire to counter destructive 
competition.8 
These three motivations were reflected in the 1919 preamble 
to the ILO's constitution, in the 1944 Philadephia declaration which 
spelled out the organization's goals for the post World War II period, 
and in the ILO's current programs promoting "core" labor standards. 
While the prevention of destructive competition is the most clearly 
consonant with Commons' standpoint, the notion that "universal and 
lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social 
justice" is also at the heart of Commons vision (ILO, 1919, preamble). 
 
8 This section draws on the following histories of the ILO: Barnes, 1926, Ghebali, 
1989, Alcock, 1971, Shotwell, 1934, Turmann, 1922.  
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In the Philadephia declaration, the ILO reaffirmed and extended 
these concerns as its primary motivations: 
1. "Labour is not a commodity" 
2. "Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity anywhere" 
3. "All human beings...have the right to pursue both their material 
well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of 
freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity” 
4. "Freedom of expression and association are essential to sustained 
progress" (ILO, 1944) 
The declaration goes on to enumerate conditions concerning 
wage, hours, employment, working conditions and other particular 
matters that it seeks to achieve. But these goals are all meant to be 
the concrete embodiment of the concerns listed above. 
The third and fourth goals require some comment. By 
mentioning spiritual development, the ILO creates a somewhat larger 
conception of human activity than is common in mainstream 
economics. However, this is perfectly consistent with Commons view 
that material abundance and leisure time were means to more 
fundamental human goals. And while in his later work Commons 
called these goals "independence" and "responsibility," it is also the 
case that there was a significant element of Christian socialism and 
Social Gospel in the foundations of Commons thought (Commons 
1934 a and b, Ramstad, 2001). 
The emphasis placed on freedom of expression and 
association, which clearly remain the most important of the ILO's 
"core" labor rights, is also central to Commons.9 He saw the 
regulatory commission as the preferred instrument for settling 
disputes over working rules that were sure to occur within the 
evolutionary process of social change. Such commissions, he argued 
should be populated be representatives of the opposing interests, not 
by people supposedly representing the public interest. So without 
freedom of expression and association, the primary body for 
adjudicating disputes could not exist, at least in the way that 
Commons envisioned it. These principles and practices continue to 
guide the ILO today in responding to the increasing international 
integration of our own period. In fact, in answering the question why 
international labor standards are needed today, the ILO's website 
starts with the statement on destructive competition from the 
Preamble to its constitution: 
 
9 The conventions on freedom of association are the most widely ratified. The special 
Committee on Freedom of Association occupies a unique place within the ILO’s 
subsidiary bodies and with its 3-3-3 makeup is the most truly tripartite and perhaps 
most effective of those bodies. 
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 "...the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of 
labour is an obstacle in  the way of other nations which desire to 
improve the conditions in their own countries" (ILO, 1919). 
In the 1997 report, "The ILO, Standards Setting and 
Globalization," the director general writes "This liberalization of trade 
carries the risk, as the Preamble to the Constitution of the ILO warns 
us, that international competition, by inhibiting the will of certain 
members to introduce progress, might be `an obstacle in the way of 
other nations which desire to improve the conditions of their own 
countries'" (ILO, 1997). This and other recent documents restate the 
priority given to social justice and commit the ILO to work with 
member states to strive for it in the new economic conditions. 
Is the ILO then an authoritative figure in the Commons 
sense? It falls short on several counts. First, despite its explicit 
commitment to tripartism, national delegations are made up of two 
government representatives and one each from labor and capital. 
Thus the "public interest" has more weight than Commons would 
have given it. This is particularly the case as many delegations from 
poor countries sometimes find it hard to send full delegations. If 
public representatives are simply two more votes for the interests of 
capital, in what sense can tripartism really be thought to function? 
The evidence here is unclear. It appears to be the case that the non-
governmental groups maintain strong separate identities because 
they are effectively organized by the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions and the International Organization of Employers. 
The employers group has been concerned with the feasibility of 
standards and has often desired to slow down standard setting so as 
to update and consolidate the existing standards. The workers’ group 
has opposed this. The government group is less homogeneous and 
tends to be most influential when employers and workers are split.10  
Second, the ILO has attempted to maintain itself as both a 
tripartite and universal institution. But tripartism is a European 
concept that evolved from the particular experience of Europe's 
industrialization. It may have little applicability outside Europe and 
the industrialized countries settled by Europeans. And indeed, 
Commons own views of reasonable value were developed by a reading 
of Anglo-American legal history. Thus what might be reasonable for 
Europe, England or the US may be by no means reasonable 
elsewhere. The notion that the ILOs principles are applicable to "all 
people everywhere," as the Philadephia declaration states, simply 
looks past very real differences on what might constitute 
reasonableness. 
The ILO has handled these contradictions in theory by 
considering social justice as a tendency and not a state. In practice, 
 
10 See the discussion in Ghebali, ch.4. These patterns were confirmed in interviews 
conducted with ILO staff in Geneva, Nov.2002. 
 
Economie et Institutions – n°2 – 1er semestre 2003 101 
countries have been allowed some degree of flexibility in adopting 
conventions. Regional standards were rejected, as "sub-standards for 
sub-humans." (Ghebali, 205). States can define the obligations of the 
limits they will assume within the confines of the convention. 
Flexibility is also sometimes achieved through general wording such 
as "appropriate," "adequate," or "promote." Flexibility has not been 
granted in the conventions dealing with core human rights or in 
those instruments dealing with unfair international competition 
however. 
The industrialized market economies see themselves as 
guardians of the ILO's conscience, and their employer and worker 
groups are clearly influenced by Western concepts of freedom. Upon 
joining the ILO after World War II, the post-colonial countries argued 
that underdevelopment hampered the implementation of standards. 
For instance, freedom of association might cause expensive social 
unrest and political agitation. At the 1984 conference the developing 
countries renewed this argument, and called for looking at the 
structural rather than the formal causes of failure to abide by 
conventions. This led the conference to move toward allowing for the 
heterogeneity of its member states during the formulation rather 
than in the enforcement of labor standards. These differences reflect 
a wider split over what constitutes rights. "Western" countries, and 
particularly the United States, have been most apt to recognize so-
called "first generation" rights, the civil rights of the individual. 
Developing countries and European social democracy have tended to 
emphasize second generation rights, economic rights (Meyer, 1998, 
ch.1). For the ILO, as for Commons, this tension is resolved by 
emphasizing what we might call process rights. The rules by which 
the social product is produced are privileged over questions 
concerning ownership and distribution.11 
Third, the process by which standards are enforced does not 
involve economic sanctions or the threat of violence, which Commons 
thought, was ultimately necessary for an authoritative institution. 
Employers or workers groups can make presentations against 
governments that can result in moral sanctions. Most governments 
tend to cooperate and adopt reforms before the formal complaint 
process is completed, so apparently the procedure has some impact. 
But there is also reason to believe that many complaints are not 
formally brought forward, because workers organizations don't want 
to deter states from ratifying additional conventions, or because they 
do not want to embarrass friendly governments. Thus there may be 
 
11 The most effective transnational rights networks have been those dealing with 
equality of opportunity and bodily harm. See Keck and Sikkink (1998), especially ch.6. 
International labor rights, as conceived by the ILO, fall partly within these categories 
but also include collective rights that sit uneasily within these essentially liberal 
categories. See McIntyre (2003b). 
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some thing to Bhagwati's claim that some conventions have been 
ratified only because it is known they will not be enforced. In its core 
values and organizational structure, the ILO is consistent with 
Commons standpoint and indeed much closer to that standpoint 
than any other international organization of which we are aware. 
However, it does not incorporate the full range of viewpoints 
necessary to succeed as a Commons type regulatory commission, its 
proclaimed universality flies in the face of Commons presumption 
that core values are worked out over time through a process of 
judicial review, and it lacks necessary enforcement capabilities. The 
ILO does embody a formal organization and an attitude to social 
justice that might let it evolve into the kind of organization necessary 
to regulate the increasingly long chains of bargaining in the 
international economy. How such an evolution might come about 
would take us far beyond the bounds of this paper. However, having 
surveyed the institution’s weaknesses from a Commons perspective, 
we conclude with two suggestions.  
 
5. The ILO and Reasonable Value 
 Contrary to Bhagwati, we do not believe the ILO would benefit much 
from "modern thinking in economics." Such thinking, in its purely 
neoclassical version, is both directly contradictory to the ILO's core values 
and organizational framework. It is also deeply embedded in the other major 
international economic organizations, the World Bank and especially the 
International Monetary Fund, organizations that directly undermine the 
ILO's mission in many developing countries.12 
 To see the first point clearly, consider Figure II: 
   Neoclassicals   Commons/ILO 
 
Purpose of  maximize individual utility  secure economic and 
moral Economic Life     security 
 
Price   automatically determined by instituted 
   market forces 
 
Markets   produce optimality and  site of authorized  
       social harmony 
       practices transferring 
       ownership and conflict  
over those practices 
 
Labor markets  like other markets; some   prone to destructive 
   possibility of market failure competition 
 
Ethics/Economics Separate matters   Inevitably intertwined 
 
 
12 The economists we interviewed at the ILO indicated without hesitation that their 
theoretical orientation was institutional. This sometimes leads to difficulty in 
communicating with economists at the other international organizations.  
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If by "modern economic thinking" Bhagwati means 
neoclassicism, he might as well ask the ILO to close up shop. If, on 
the other hand, he means the "new information economics," or “new 
institutional economics" then he would have the ILO adopt an 
analytical framework that, at its best, has rediscovered some of 
Commons insights by using neoclassical assumptions, and even then 
is inconsistent with the economics of the other major international 
organizations. Space limitations prevent us from a full consideration 
of this issue.13 But there is no question that the "new institutional 
economics," if adopted by the ILO, would not bridge the gulf between 
the ILO, the Bank, and the Fund. This is seen most clearly in the 
writings and career of one of the leaders of this school, Joseph 
Stiglitz, who was fired from his position as chief economist at the 
Bank for questioning the conventional wisdom (Wade, 2001.)  
In his dissent to the Meltzer commission report on reforming 
the international financial institutions, Jerome Levinson makes it 
clear that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are 
actively involved in undermining the social norms behind labor 
rights. The Bank claims to be "analyzing the effects" of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining "in order to form an opinion." 
The Bank claims that incorporating core labor rights into its decision 
making inserts a political dimension which is a violation of the 
Bank's charter (Levinson, 2000.)14  
The Bank regularly encourages loan recipients to increase 
"labor market flexibility" which they are able to believe is not a 
political directive, although in practice increased flexibility makes it 
easier for firms to fire workers and makes it harder for unions to 
negotiate on behalf of their members. 
The founders of the Bretton Woods institutions, John 
Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, clearly saw the protection 
of Labor's interests as a precondition for liberalizing trade and 
finance (Helleiner, 1994). Indeed, the original charter for the 
International Labor Organization had an entire chapter devoted to 
labor standards and trade.  
Stiglitz, former Bank chief economist, wrote that “when labor 
issues came up at the Bank they did so mainly within a narrowly 
economic focus and even more narrowly through the lens of 
 
13 Kaufman and Hotchkiss (2000) present the “new institutional school” as the fourth 
generation of institutional thought following from the founders (Commons, Veblen, 
etc.), the neo-institutionalists (Kerr, Lester, etc.) and dual labor market theory (Piore, 
Doeringer, Bluestone). It uses neoclassical efficiency concepts to explain institutional 
characteristics of labor markets. Whether and to what extent this school is within the 
institutional tradition is beyond the scope of this paper but see Hillard and McIntyre 
(1994). For an analysis that sees many of these developments as neoclassical theory’s 
increasing ability to deal with non-neoclassical critics, see Boyer and Smith (2001). 
14 More recently the Bank has published a report that is more favorable to trade 
unions (World Bank, 2003). It is not clear what impact this will have on policy. 
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neoclassical economics; a standard message was to increase labor 
market flexibility - the not so subtle sub-text was to lower wages” 
(Stiglitz, 2000, p.1). In any institutionally and historically informed 
view, the design of a labor relations system is more than a process of 
achieving optimum (i.e. blackboard) efficiency. Rather, it is the result 
of a long history of social conflict in which political, natural and 
cultural factors interact with a variety of economic considerations, 
including but also well beyond efficiency. If one accepts the 
Commons/Hobbesian view, then the labor relations system is best 
seen as an integral component of the social compact and should not 
be treated as if it were the result of a blackboard-engineering 
problem.  
For instance, just a bit of historical sensitivity might have 
alerted IMF and World Bank economists to the possibility that 
market liberalization and privatization of state assets would lead to 
social distress. Since a strong labor movement is often at the 
forefront of movements for social justice, Stiglitz now argues that 
liberalization and privatization might wisely have been accompanied 
by strengthening of unions and other labor market institutions 
(Stiglitz, 2000). Of course, Stiglitz was fired for this and other 
violations of the Washington consensus (Wade 2001). 
In both the World Trade Organization and Free Trade Area of 
the Americas negotiations, US negotiators have argued for stronger 
action on labor rights but they have not made this a priority. Yet 
Congress has already legislated that recipient countries must 
effectively assure core worker rights. In 1995 Congress passed the 
Sanders/Frank amendment, requiring the Treasury to direct US 
representatives to these institutions to use their "voice and vote" to 
encourage both the institutions and borrowing countries to respect 
core worker rights as an integral part of their structural adjustment 
programs. In approving the US quota increase for the IMF in 1998, 
Congress added the requirement that worker rights not be 
undermined by Fund or Bank mandates for "labor market flexibility."  
Though the will of Congress is clear, these policies have never 
been implemented. The US representatives to the Fund and the Bank 
have never voted against financing governments that are notorious 
abusers of core labor rights. One problem is that the Treasury guides 
policy in this area and the Treasury has made assisting the security 
and mobility of capital its main goal since the 1970s (Helleiner, 
1994).  
Levinson proposes giving the Labor Department a greater role 
in certifying labor policies under Sanders/Frank, allowing non-
governmental organizations to file Sanders/Frank petitions, and 
using ILO documents in findings. He also argues for amending the 
WTO charter to include core labor rights. 
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The use of ILO materials in findings of US law would be 
helpful in promoting the ILO as an authoritative figure. The ILO, 
because of tripartism, is a preferred format for designing working 
rules for international labor rights. The ILO is the only international 
organization that is tripartite, even if its practice is not as strong as 
its principle. The promotion of the ILO as an arbiter of authoritative 
and authorized practices would serve as a counterweight to the IMF 
and World Bank. Promoting the ILO as a “regulatory commission for 
international labor problems” is a sound idea given the Commons 
vision. 
The ILO could become and to some extent already is the place 
where the meaning of organizing concepts such as reasonable and 
fairness can be debated and confronted with other such concepts. It 
should, in our view, be promoted as an authoritative institution, 
particularly in dealing with labor aspects of international economic 
activity between countries at markedly different social and economic 
characteristics.  
Levinson’s suggestion that non-governmental organizations 
should be able to petition under Sanders-Frank is also a good one. 
This builds on experience with the North American Agreement on 
Labour Cooperation. Upholding a slightly broader definition of core 
labor rights than the ILO, NAALC and its commissions and offices 
have been a modest success. It has promoted a variety of cooperative 
activities for scholars and the social partners, which has promoted 
cross-border labor solidarity in the region. It has taken and heard 
cases that have promoted transparency in labor law administration 
in all countries. Not only has NAALC helped to strengthen Mexico’s 
enforcement of its own labor laws in some cases, it has given labor 
organizers another avenue to highlight declining human and labor 
rights in the US. This is not to say that NAALC or the EU’s social 
clause can substitute for other forms of international labor 
regulation. But the “sunshine effect” of these cases certainly 
contributes to rising public awareness and debate, and ultimately to 
organizing and political pressure. And by providing more examples of 
“the possible,” such cases may provide a rich pool of examples for 
dealing with international labor disputes in a world of uneven 
economic development.  
Strengthening the ILO as an authoritative international 
institution while broadening access to decision making in regional 
agreements are appropriate responses to the unevenness of the 
development of capitalism over the last several decades. Economic 
life has become both globalized and regionalized. Industrial relations 
scholars used to believe in the convergence of systems, and that view 
may still have some validity, especially within the European Union. 
But “globalization” has not eliminated all differences between 
national systems and even in Europe some form of super-national 
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regulation is necessary. This is all the more applicable to North 
America and especially to FTAA, to say nothing of the overwhelmingly 
difficult problem of producing agreement on reasonable value across 
the countries making up the WTO.  
Ultimately, we would hope that, through the promotion of the 
ILO as an authoritative institution on international labor problems, 
that the WTO would come to accept some version of ILO core labor 
rights into its charter. In the Philadephia declaration, the ILO stated 
that all international economic policies should be judged in terms of 
their impact on the right of all human beings "to pursue both their 
material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of 
freedom and dignity." If international economic integration is not to 
lead to international social disintegration, it seems to us that the 
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